يفتح في علامة تبويب جديدة

What does the battle of Kerkennah teach us?

محتجّون في قرقنة يرفعون لافتة تطالب بتمويل صندوق تنمية الجهة من الشركات البترولية

First published in Arabic on Nawaat (Opinion section) on 18 April 2016, then on Inhiyez on 23 October 2017.

Read in: العربية · Français · Español

Editor’s note: this article was written in April 2016, during the Kerkennah protests; references to “the head of government”, “this winter” and “recent days” are to that time.

“The Popular Front and Hizb ut-Tahrir are behind the violence in Kerkennah,” the head of government told us the day before yesterday. The day before that, one of the stars of the police unions had beaten him to it with a show of his intelligence-gathering muscle, as the guest of a media personality who, as luck would have it, is known for her passion for the heroics of the “republican security forces.” It was a fitting occasion to reveal to the people that the ogre of “terrorism” had once again reared its head, this time in Kerkennah, after the authorities had spent weeks celebrating its defeat in Ben Guerdane.

No doubt a section of Tunisians, forever anxious about the safety of the “model” of society, will believe this nonsense and help spread it. But I am certain that the majority feel they are watching repeated scenes from a familiar film. In truth, these statements give us rich material for analysis, for they belong to a phenomenon that recurs almost mechanically and with largely similar features.

The “ruling gang” and its strategy of control

What we are dealing with is a modified version of the same policy used to crush social and civic mobilisation since the 2008 uprising in the Gafsa mining basin, through the uprising of 17 December 2010, Siliana in 2012 and the protests in the governorate of Kebili in 2015, up to the Kasserine uprising and the protests in working-class neighbourhoods this winter, among others. But it should first be pointed out that this policy is part of the strategy through which the ruling gang (the more accurate equivalent, in the Tunisian context, of the term “ruling class”) controls the country. It is worth stressing that the word “gang” is not used impressionistically or as an insult: I contend that it is an objective description of the make-up of our ruling class (which is much broader than the party components of the governing team). How could it be otherwise, when its most prominent figures include a president suspected of involvement with swindlers from the former regime and of intervening to obstruct judicial proceedings against them; the leader of a governing party suspected of corruption over the source of his money; a minister who has no qualms about drafting tenders tailored to his friends in Western banks; the director of an influential company suspected of involvement with the corruption mafia in the oil sector; the leader of an “opposition” party seeking to smuggle his money abroad; a former foreign minister who receives foreign donations into his personal account; and so on. Since there is no room here to detail the make-up of the “ruling gang,” suffice it to say that the executive (government and presidency) is only its façade, the tip of the iceberg. The final say belongs, first, to the representatives of the international financial institutions, the multinational corporations and the most powerful Western states, and second, to their local agents in the comprador bourgeoisie (from the Portuguese for one who buys up goods cheaply on behalf of foreign companies), whose code name is the “Union of Industry and Trade” (UTICA), and which lives off their crumbs.

This strategy of control is carried out by armies of mercenaries, or of people with no say in the matter, drawn from the middle and impoverished classes and deployed mainly in three sectors: legislation, the media and the police. The first lays down the framework needed to legalise the plundering of the people’s wealth and the surrender of the country’s sovereignty (for example, the new investment code, the statute of the Central Bank, free trade agreements, loan agreements, military cooperation agreements, etc.). The second plays a central role (alongside educational institutions, “civil society” and others) in entrenching the cultural hegemony that every ruling class needs in order to tame society ideologically and morally. The third is the stick with which the ruling class disciplines marginalised and oppressed groups when they manage to break free of the shackles of cultural hegemony and take the initiative to organise and fight to win back some of their rights. In the same vein, the anarchist thinker Noam Chomsky says:

Propaganda is to a democracy what the bludgeon is to a totalitarian state.

Chomsky drew this conclusion mainly from his analysis of the stable liberal democracies of the West, which explains why the policies designed for “our transitional situation” still rely more heavily on the police baton, even if less than under Ben Ali.

How does the plan to crush social mobilisation work?

It should first be noted that the way the mainstream media (that is, traditional media, especially television and radio, owned by the state and by capital) treat social mobilisation (which covers every form of protest carrying mainly economic and social demands) varies somewhat with the identity of the parties to the class alliance holding power. It is worth recalling that most of these media were far more enamoured of social and regional justice when their owners, organically tied to the pre-revolution ruling elite, had the task of redressing the balance of power that had tilted towards the Ennahdha movement after the 2011 elections. No sooner had the Western-sponsored “consensus” produced the government of Mehdi Jomaa, a former executive at one of the Total group’s companies, than all the mainstream media discovered that social mobilisation harms the “national economy” and “national unity,” and that it was time to “get back to work.” In general, the plan for crushing social mobilisation can be divided into successive stages, each one adopted when the previous one has failed:

  1. The mainstream media ignore social protests at the outset, in the hope that they will die out by themselves: This has become harder since the “revolution,” especially when the spark of the protests is a dramatic event that leads to a popular outburst or to clashes with the security forces (Siliana 2012 or Kasserine 2016). But it remains possible when the protests are limited, especially if they are far from the capital and carried out by small groups that fail to build alliances with other sectors of society (the recent sit-ins of the unemployed in the mining basin and in Dahmani), or when their interests clash with those of social actors from whom support might be expected (above all workers’ actions, the most recent being the sit-in of the guards of the electricity company STEG, who were let down by the unions of the UGTT).

  2. Relative attention, while entrenching the ruling gang’s narrative: The move to this second stage comes when social mobilisation is strong and creates a balance of power that lets it break through attempts to ignore it in the media. There are generally two kinds of strong social protest. The first is a popular outburst that erupts suddenly in reaction to a dramatic event that shakes people, in which protesters clash with the security forces and target the seats of political power (for example, the death of the young Ridha Yahyaoui in Kasserine). The second is a social movement that starts on a narrow scale and without media fanfare, but manages to develop its tactics to the point of creating pressure on the ground that hurts the interests of one of the pillars of the “ruling gang” (halting Petrofac’s production in Kerkennah, or blocking the transport of phosphate from the mining basin). In the first case the security forces intervene from the start, but the fall of victims robs this intervention of its effectiveness and widens popular solidarity, so the authorities have to drop it for the time being and concentrate more on the media front. Undoubtedly, one of the most important lessons the authorities learned from the 17 December uprising, under the guidance and advice of counsellors from the Western powers “sponsoring the democratic transition,” is not to rely too heavily on security repression and to count as much as possible on “soft power.” Events have shown that live ammunition and the fall of martyrs inflame protests rather than put them out.

    In the second case of strong mobilisation, security intervention comes later. When the media blackout fails and the protesters manage to keep up the pressure on the ground long enough to hurt capital, capital is forced to call on its ally, the state (the code name of political power), which steps in to rescue it with its repressive apparatus. And when the social movement manages to withstand the police onslaught and widen the circle of solidarity around it (as happened in Kerkennah in recent days), the mainstream media are forced to move from the stage of ignoring it to the stage of “understanding while imposing the gang’s narrative.” This is the stage that prevailed last week, before the latest statements mentioned at the beginning of this article.

    At this stage the mainstream media show some sympathy and understanding for the demands of marginalised groups, but try to hold them to rules of the game that suit the ruling gang. In every case this “sympathy” is conditional on the protest remaining “peaceful,” as though pseudo-journalists, politicians and pampered “experts” had the right to tell the oppressed how to break the chains of their oppression. Nor is there any harm in this “understanding” coming with some criticism of “the authorities’ impotence and corruption,” while their representatives are given room to make their customary promises to “hold the guilty to account” and “put things right.” In parallel, the corps of “economic experts” is called in to serve up analyses steeped in neoliberal broth, so that viewers, especially those in the middle class whose human sympathy does not stop them from wanting stability back as soon as possible, understand that there is no alternative to “speeding up the economic reforms needed to attract foreign investors,” because “the state is unable to create wealth and solve the problem of unemployment.”

    If, on the other hand, the protesters fail to generate significant public sympathy or tension on the ground, the media prefer to speak of them in the third person, usually when a representative of political or economic power is recounting whatever version of events suits him. This is what happened at the start of the Petrofac affair in Kerkennah, and with the recent sit-ins in the mining basin, Dahmani and elsewhere. Over recent months we watched Imed Derouiche, the oil company’s representative, move as an honoured guest from one mainstream outlet to another: radio stations, television channels and specialised economic publications. Naturally, none of the “journalists” who interviewed him dared to question him about his name appearing as a suspect in the “oil mafia” in the report of the late Abdelfattah Amor. Nor did we see representatives of the unemployed sit-in protesters on television sets or in the news before the recent clashes broke out. In this second case (Kerkennah as against Kasserine), media invitations and coverage of the authorities’ representatives, despite their direct involvement in the affair, are confined to scolding them for failing to protect the interests of “investors” and to restore stability.

    If, after two weeks at most, stage 2 has not ended with the protests being put down, the move to the third stage follows.

  3. Smearing and criminalising the movement, and inventing “instigators”: Alongside the discourse of “understanding” and the promises of “development solutions,” the protests are smeared gradually and deliberately in order to criminalise them and break up public sympathy for them. This is done by the mainstream media focusing on incidents of “violence.” It is well known that these media have decided in advance that the oppressed have no right to use violence in response to the material and non-material violence exercised against them by the pillars of the ruling gang and its repressive arms, above all the greatest violence of all: their impoverishment and exclusion from the cycle of wealth distribution monopolised by members of the ruling class. At this point the ruling class, by leaking unconfirmed statements from political officials or by sending some of its petty mercenaries to appear in the media, sets about accusing “parties that have nothing to do with the protesters and their legitimate demands” of “being behind the violence” or of “handing out money to demonstrators.” The choice usually falls on political groups that sing out of tune with the flock, such as the Popular Front, the Congress for the Republic, Hizb ut-Tahrir and so on. To add to the confusion, the revised and more sensational version is brought out: that there are “sleeper terrorist cells seeking to exploit the chaos and the security vacuum to seize weapons and bring down the state,” and so on. This happened during the December uprising, three months ago in Kasserine, before that in the protests in the south, and today in Kerkennah. Who knows where the “sleeper cells” will wake up tomorrow morning?

  4. Wearing the movement down and going back to ignoring it: The third stage usually succeeds in putting down the protests, or at least in weakening and marginalising them. This success is always relative and temporary, because it does not remove their causes (the protests in Kasserine, Dahmani and the mining basin). But even this temporary success is not guaranteed, since it depends on the nature of the movement and the tactics its members adopt. In the case of the recent Kasserine uprising, the ruling gang simply vacated the offices of the regional authorities and let the unemployed hold their sit-in there. The protesters, for their part, failed to keep the flame of popular solidarity and local pressure on the ground alive, because they did not manage to develop a discourse that went beyond the limits of their own narrow group and settled for vague slogans about “jobs and development for the governorate of Kasserine.” Nor did they demand concrete measures that would embarrass the authorities and help them win the support of wider sectors. And despite the importance of the decision to move part of the battle to the capital, and their heroic endurance for two months out in the open in front of the Ministry of Employment, their failure to seek a broader alliance with the unemployed from other regions deprived this bold step of its potential to grow. All this, and more, allowed the authorities, in the case of the Kasserine sit-ins and the recent sit-ins in the mining basin, to settle for besieging them with security forces and ignoring them in the media. But will that work in Kerkennah too?

  5. Finishing off the movement through judicial and police harassment: Once the protesters have been worn down and cut off from their local popular base, and public attention has turned to new issues, it becomes easy for the ruling gang to finish off social movements. This is usually done by prosecuting the sit-in participants, then raiding them, arresting them and beating them far from the media spotlight. The arrests set off a solidarity campaign by political activists, and the protesters are released after a short time. They go home for some well-earned rest, and their supporters go back to their many daily battles. That is how the movement ends; but since its causes have not gone away, it may well flare up again in the future.

What sets the Kerkennah movement apart?

The social movement in Kerkennah has a number of distinctive features. The first, or rather, chronologically, the last, is that it succeeded in repelling the onslaught of the repressive machine, and even in humiliating it.

Second, the protesters’ remarkable tactical maturity. They adopted a carefully worked-out plan that reveals a sharp intelligence. Its most striking feature is that they targeted big capital directly instead of merely putting pressure on the state. They know full well that real decision-making power lies with the former, and that it costs the latter nothing to leave its administrative offices to the sit-in protesters (indeed, it is counting on the anger of the region’s other residents at the disruption of administrative services), or even to vacate its police stations and hand them over to the army. Capital, however (Petrofac, in the case at hand), can put up with the protesters halting production for a while. But when their pressure reaches the point of threatening its profits, it finds itself forced to react, ferociously if need be. It then turns once again to the state, in the form of its repressive apparatus, to crush the protesters. For the state is nothing but an executive instrument in the hands of capital, especially big and foreign capital. Or, as Lenin quotes Marx in The State and Revolution, it is “an organ of class rule, an organ for the oppression of one class by another; it is the creation of ‘order’, which legalises and perpetuates this oppression.” This brings me to a disagreement with my friend Thameur Mekki over the title he chose for the most important and best piece of serious journalism produced on the events in Kerkennah [titled “Kerkennah: Petrofac and the state’s abdication”].

Describing the state’s stance on what is happening as “abdication” and “weakness” suggests that it is neutral or unable to intervene, whereas its use of its repressive apparatus on behalf of foreign capital shows which camp it is in. Likewise, its going back on the agreement it signed with the sit-in protesters is not a sign of “abdication” but a calculated retreat, since the agreement does not serve the oil company’s interests. The success of this approach in Kerkennah, after it had failed earlier in the El Faouar sit-in, would be a qualitative leap and would offer a model that unemployed people in other regions might try to follow. The success of the unemployed’s sit-in in Kerkennah would therefore be a “dangerous precedent” that big capital and its allies in the ruling gang cannot allow to take hold.

The Kerkennah protesters also stood out for their measured media discourse. Although they targeted capital, they made clever use of the fact that most of the field operated by Petrofac belongs to the Tunisian Enterprise for Petroleum Activities (ETAP). They surely know that this is only a formality. But it helped them answer those who believe there is a difference between the state and capital, and who blame them for “halting the company’s production” when it was the state that walked away from the agreement it had signed with them. The protesters also deserve credit for successfully linking several issues that concern other residents of Kerkennah, in particular the environmental damage caused by energy companies and the threat they pose to the livelihoods of the island’s fishermen. Finally, there was their shrewd decision to move their sit-in from in front of the company’s production site to a road near the residential area, which kept the forces of repression from isolating them and led to wide solidarity from local residents.

Lastly, there is no doubt that the ruling gang’s “security solution” has failed resoundingly in Kerkennah. That is why we now see it applying stage 3 of its usual plan for breaking social movements: smearing the movement in order to criminalise it. But this does not mean it has given up the security option altogether. The ruling gang may return to it in other forms if its attempts to smear and wear down the unemployed do not succeed, especially if they keep their vision clear and go on targeting the real holder of power: capital.

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