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Tunisia: the growing policy of “soft normalisation” with Zionism and its entity

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First published in Arabic in Al-Adab in September 2017, then on Inhiyez on 18 October 2017.

Read in: العربية · Français · Español

Editor’s note: this article was written in 2017. Officials described as “current” held those posts at the time.

The recent battle against the show of the Zionist French comedian of Tunisian origin Michel Boujenah[1] was a new chapter in a long and bitter struggle in Tunisia against normalisation with Zionism and its illegitimate entity. This struggle began almost with the launch of the Zionist project at the start of the last century,[2] and has run in parallel with the original struggle over Palestine. Suffice it to recall, for example, how Tunisians refused to allow the criminal and famous Zionist ideologue Ze’ev Jabotinsky to enter Tunisia in the 1930s, forcing the French colonial authorities to cancel the visit through demonstrations and a strike.[3]

The recent history of normalisation

We will not dwell on the Bourguiba era, and will focus on the period that saw normalisation activity accelerate in Tunisia.

Quite obviously, the signing of the liquidationist Oslo Accords between “Israel” and the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1993 can be considered the real birth of open normalisation in Tunisia. In its wake, two “interests offices” were opened between the dictatorship of [ousted president] Ben Ali and the Tel Aviv regime in April 1994. It was said among Tunisian opponents that the Zionist liaison office was located in the Belgian embassy. The Tunisian office was headed by Khemaies Jhinaoui, the current foreign minister.[4] The office’s closure was announced after the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in 2000.

Despite the weight of the dictatorship, Tunisian militants spared no effort to confront normalisation from its start under Ben Ali. A number of them organised an unauthorised demonstration in the capital against the massacre at the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron, and distributed a statement entitled “Death to Zionism” denouncing the regime’s moves towards normalisation; several were arrested and imprisoned.[5] The same happened each time news of some act of normalisation leaked out. Among the most notable mass actions against normalisation in Tunisia over the following decade: in 2002 activists, mainly students, blocked the screening of a film by a Tunisian director who had taken part in a festival in occupied Jerusalem.[6]

There were also the huge protests that swept the country after it leaked that Ben Ali had invited the criminal Ariel Sharon to the UN World Summit on the Information Society in 2005.[7] The Tunisian authorities were then forced to withdraw the invitation to Sharon, but allowed his foreign minister, Sylvan Shalom, who is of Tunisian origin, to come and visit his birthplace, the city of Gabès, despite popular rejection and opposition protests.[8]

Silvan Shalom in Tunisia in 2005
Silvan Shalom in Tunisia in 2005

The move towards “distributing normalisation”

No known official attempts at normalisation followed. It seems clear that the Zionists and their agents in Tunisia decided to pursue a less provocative and “softer” normalisation policy. They abandoned imposing official normalisation with the state — which in the collective imagination represents the whole country and its people, whoever governs it — measures that the opposition can easily denounce and mobilise people against. Instead, they focused on targeting specific segments of society through which people’s consciousness could gradually be influenced and the psychological barrier to accepting normalisation broken. This policy continues to this day, with adjustments required by the new situation.

This explains the reliance on a handful of normalising professors at Tunisian universities[9] to organise unannounced visits to occupied Palestine, especially to attend international conferences bringing together Zionist and Tunisian academics. The battle in 2004 over hosting the congress of the International Geographical Union in Tunisia is perhaps the most prominent example.[10]

Some journalists were also won over — those cut off from their people’s causes, or always ready to hire out their pens to defend unjust causes.[11] Some relatively popular media outlets were pushed into normalising activities, as happened in 2007 with the newspaper Assabah, which announced its participation in a competition for children organised by the “Peres Center for Peace” in Spain. Tunisian artists, mostly little-known, were lured with tempting sums of money to give concerts for Zionists of Tunisian origin in occupied Palestine.[12]

In parallel, trade and economic exchanges were encouraged. Perhaps the most notable was the opening by one of Ben Ali’s in-laws of a direct air route between Djerba and Tel Aviv, on the pretext of carrying “Israeli pilgrims” to the Ghriba synagogue on the island of Djerba.[13] It is also worth recalling that the current tourism minister, Selma Elloumi Rekik, had previously visited the Zionist entity as part of a private agricultural project.[14]

In general, things did not change much after the 17 December uprising that led to Ben Ali’s fall. As the revolutionary mass tide receded (a tide that at its height raised the slogan “The people want the liberation of Palestine”) and the forces of counter-revolution triumphed, the normalisers resumed their activities with the same impudence, or more.

After the 17 December uprising was aborted: from defence to attack

The Zionists and their partners in Tunisia succeeded in containing the wave of enthusiasm that marked the first momentum of the revolutionary tide. Besides their old ties with the elites of the Ben Ali regime, who were slowly returning, they pursued a policy of co-opting the Islamists. From the outset, Western — specifically American — reliance on the Islamists’ compliant leadership of the “democratic transition process” was clear. This explains the repeated meetings between leaders of the “Islamist” Ennahdha movement — whose leaders long boasted of their hostility to “Israel” — and leading pro-Zionist Americans such as Senators Joseph Lieberman and John McCain, and their acceptance of invitations from research institutions known for their loyalty to the Zionist lobby in Washington.[15]

There is no doubt that the Zionists exploited the Islamists’ burning desire to reach power, and the difficulties of the new period, to “bargain” with them in one way or another over the degree of their commitment to the Palestinian cause. This explains the statements by Rached Ghannouchi and Hamadi Jebali distancing themselves from the traditional unconditional support for Palestine. It became even clearer when the possibility of including an article in the constitution against Zionism and normalisation with its entity was discussed: foreign pressure was applied[16] which led the ruling troika[17] to give in, and Ennahdha’s deputies — the largest movement in the Constituent Assembly — voted against it. Ennahdha, along with the Nidaa Tounes party that has led the government since the 2014 elections, also stalled the debate on two draft laws[18] criminalising normalisation with the Zionist entity.

The failure to “criminalise normalisation,” constitutionally or by law, threw the door wide open for the Zionists and their local agents to resume their normalising efforts. What distinguishes their policy since 14 January, and especially since late 2014, is its focus on intensifying and speeding up normalising activities and practices, making resistance to them difficult and of weak effect, and discouraging those who wage it. The Zionists are undoubtedly exploiting the fragmentation of the new political scene after the Tunisian uprising of 2011, and the resulting rush of events and the variety of battles that radical anti-normalisation militants have been forced to fight.

The Jomaa government and the turning point

Normalising practices reached a turning point with the arrival of the transitional “technocrat government,” imposed by the G8 countries with the help of the employers’ union as a way out of the escalating power struggle between the two rights, the religious and the “modernist.”

While Ennahdha, which was “softly” removed from power at the start of 2014, tried not to rush into normalisation so as not to anger its base, traditionally sympathetic to Palestine, things changed with the new government. Besides its neoliberal and anti-national policies, this government included a significant number of officials who had previously worked for multinational companies.

Among them was Amel Karboul, appointed tourism minister, who had lived most of her life in Germany. This minister caused wide controversy among Tunisians for two reasons: first, when they learned that her professional record included a visit to “Israel”; and second, when she strongly defended the entry of Israeli tourists into Tunisia after the interior ministry had initially barred them.[19] The questioning of the minister by some opposition parties on this subject was an occasion for Tunisians to discover the shallowness of their representatives in parliament and their lack of seriousness in confronting normalisation. This allowed Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa, a former employee of a company linked to the oil giant Total, to brush the matter aside with a famous, foolish remark: “Normalisation, no normalisation — let’s leave these big issues aside. Tourism is in danger!”[20]

After that, news of normalisation and normalisers followed one after another, concentrated mainly in sport and the arts, which had been taboo in the past. The tennis player Malek Jaziri, whom the sports ministry had forced to withdraw from a match against an Israeli player in 2013, played another Israeli in 2016, and the news passed almost unnoticed! The Tunisian pétanque team also played the Zionist team and won a “victory” that one media outlet did not hesitate to celebrate in a sickening “militant” tone.[21]

In the arts, the shameful photo of the singer Saber Rebaï with a Zionist soldier came as a great shock to Tunisians.[22] One positive effect of this incident was that it raised the issue of “unintentional normalisation” or “indirect normalisation” (which can become very direct, as we saw with Rebaï) entailed by visiting the occupied West Bank. Indeed, it is no exaggeration in this case to speak of “double normalisation,” whatever the visitors’ intentions: first with the Israeli who grants the “permit” and decides who may and may not enter part of the occupied land; and second with the humiliated Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, which “coordinates on security” with the occupation. This issue is still debated even with sincere activists and intellectuals whose hostility to Zionism is beyond doubt.

Saber Rebai with a Zionist soldier
Saber Rebai with a Zionist soldier

The “civil society” gateway

“Civil society” (in the prevailing liberal sense) is one of the relatively new fields of normalisation after 14 January 2011: the atmosphere of the so-called “democratic transition” under imperialist tutelage allowed all kinds of penetration. These include numerous initiatives and conferences bringing Tunisians together with Zionists or Israelis under various headings, the most important perhaps being “Euro-Mediterranean” ones.[23] Wajdi Ben Mohamed, who took part in a training seminar for “young leaders” in Tunisia organised by an American organisation, Search for Common Ground,[24] recalls how one evening he found himself at a table with Israeli participants (not Palestinians of 1948, of course) whose presence had not been announced. What surprised him more was that other Palestinian members defended “their right to take part!” He concluded that the organisation was hiding their identity and passing them off as part of the “Palestinian” delegation.

It does not stop at events where Tunisian participants find themselves alongside Zionists. The new situation has also been used by some mercenaries to set up associations claiming to “defend minorities” or to research “their history and heritage,” in order to market a clearly normalising discourse. We recently saw, during the battle over the show of the pro-Zionist Michel Boujenah, how the president of one such association rushed to defend the show, accusing opponents of normalisation of “antisemitism,” and how the Zionist media celebrated her hollow statements.[25] Unfortunately, these mercenaries’ task becomes easier when the support they receive is not limited to Western and Zionist institutions and embassies, but includes moral support from the Oslo Authority group.[26]

On the causes and prospects of anti-normalisation in Tunisia

One does not need much insight to understand that the revival of normalisation, with its new “soft” features, directly reflects the new political situation in Tunisia. Under the domination of a comprador bourgeois elite that carefully carries out the dictates of the imperialist centres and their international financial arms, nothing but this blatant collusion can be expected from the ruling political authorities. Everyone knows how much Zionist influence there is in Western centres of political and financial decision-making. And the process of taming the Arab popular uprisings, under way since 2011, necessarily involves further abandoning the logic of national and regional unity and South–South solidarity, and confrontation with the Zionist enemy.

With consumerist values prevailing, and with critical thought and political movements with radical projects in retreat, self-evident principles such as supporting the Palestinian struggle and opposing normalisation become a form of arduous resistance.

Among the new difficulties noticed recently is what might be considered a side effect of the global success of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement. Some in Tunisia, including intellectuals, have begun mechanically and superficially adopting a boycott position towards the Zionist presence in Tunisia, instead of demanding that it be banned and criminalised — as we saw in the recent debate over Boujenah’s show — as if this were an event in Europe, and not in the Arab world, where the conflict with Zionism is existential. One young artist, in a discussion with me, refused to support the demand that the show be cancelled on the grounds of “respect for artistic freedom and freedom of choice,” settling for boycotting it, and asked me: “When will we have BDS in Tunisia?” — believing that BDS is limited to boycott and does not oppose normalisation, which is wrong.[27]

Despite this, opponents of normalisation in Tunisia have achieved a number of relative victories in recent years. Two years ago the association Qawem obtained a court ruling cancelling “religious tourism” trips to occupied Jerusalem organised by some travel agencies.[28] The Tunisian Campaign for the Boycott of Israel and Against Normalisation persuaded several Tunisian filmmakers to withdraw from the Locarno festival (Switzerland), whose 2015 edition was devoted to celebrating “Israeli cinema.”[29] And most recently, the screening of the film Wonder Woman, whose lead is played by a former Israeli soldier, was cancelled after student protests followed by a lawsuit filed by the nationalist People’s Movement.[30]

These victories, along with the significant momentum of the battle over Boujenah’s show, point to the possibility of escalating the anti-normalisation movement in Tunisia in the future. This can be done by further networking the efforts of activists in the different areas of support for the Palestinian cause (the committee in support of Georges Ibrahim Abdallah, the boycott and anti-normalisation campaign, the Qawem association, youth groups, trade unionists and progressive intellectuals, etc.), and above all by further linking the struggle for Palestine with the daily struggle, among our people, against neoliberalism, colonialism and domination in all its forms.

Notes

  1. Statement by the Tunisian Campaign for the Boycott of Israel and Against Normalisation: https://nawaat.org/2017/06/26/رسالة-مفتوحة-إلى-وزير-الثقافة-ومدير-مه/ ↩
  2. For more on the history of the Zionist movement in Tunisia, see the important book by the historian Hedi Timoumi, Zionist Activity in Tunisia, 1897–1948 (in Arabic; Tunis: Dar Mohamed Ali El Hammi, 1982). ↩
  3. Tunisian sources disagree on the date of the aborted visit, but a Zionist academic source places it in 1932. The journalist Chedli Khairallah and his newspaper La Voix du Tunisien played a central role. https://www.persee.fr/doc/outre_0300-9513_1990_num_77_286_2758 ↩
  4. Jhinaoui defending himself after protests at his appointment as foreign minister: https://lc.cx/cbQt [link no longer works] ↩
  5. Specifically the former secretary-general of the secondary-education union, Ahmed Kahlaoui, who was accused of organising the action, tried, imprisoned for three years and dismissed from his job. ↩
  6. https://www.addustour.com/articles/473031-الجمهور-يوقف-عرض- ↩
  7. A statement with a good summary of the main actions in Tunisia during that period: https://lc.cx/cavV [link no longer works] ↩
  8. https://lc.cx/cRTo [link no longer works] ↩
  9. Most prominently the pair Habib Kazdaghli and Abdelhamid Larguèche, who teach at the Faculty of Letters, Arts and Humanities of Manouba. ↩
  10. For more on this affair and on the history of normalisation in Tunisia, see the valuable study by Professor Mounir Saïdani, “No to the normalisers’ front in Tunisia,” which he gave me directly. He has recently begun publishing it in instalments in the Manarat supplement of Echaab, the newspaper of the UGTT. ↩
  11. The best known being Ridha Kéfi, owner of the Kapitalis website, and Khemaies Khayati. ↩
  12. https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2010/8/4/انتقاد-فنانين-تونسيين-زاروا-إسرائيل ↩
  13. https://lc.cx/cRvm [link no longer works] ↩
  14. http://www.lepoint.fr/actualites-economie/2007-01-17/selma-elloumi-rekik-une-agricultriceen-talons-hauts/916/0/17519 ↩
  15. https://lc.cx/cDiQ [link no longer works] ↩
  16. https://lc.cx/cH5z — on a letter from the president of the German Bundestag to the president of the Constituent Assembly, containing a veiled threat to isolate Tunisia if its constitution criminalised normalisation. ↩
  17. A coalition led by Ennahdha, whose secretary-general Hamadi Jebali became prime minister, supported by two parties: the Congress for the Republic, led by Moncef Marzouki as president of the republic, and Ettakatol (the Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties), led by Mustapha Ben Jaafar as president of the Constituent Assembly. ↩
  18. The first was submitted by deputies of the Wafa Movement during the constituent period, the second by deputies of the Popular Front in the parliament elected in December 2014. ↩
  19. https://lc.cx/cH7k ↩
  20. https://lc.cx/cH8E ↩
  21. https://lc.cx/cH2r ↩
  22. https://nawaat.org/2016/08/24/الحملة-التونسية-لمناهضة-التطبيع-تدين/ ↩
  23. This is in fact not entirely new; it began gradually with the launch of the “Barcelona Process” in 1994. Personally, when I took part in 2003, on behalf of the youth of the (former) Progressive Democratic Party, in a conference of the “Euro-Mediterranean Network of Young Citizens” in Paris, I became suspicious of one participant who sometimes presented himself as French and sometimes as Spanish. I later discovered (after checking email addresses and searching online) that he was an official of a Zionist student organisation in Europe. It is worth noting that one of the main organisers of that meeting was Noureddine Ben Ticha, a former leftist militant who has since become a political adviser to Beji Caïd Essebsi. ↩
  24. This American organisation was founded in the context of the Cold War in the 1980s by a former State Department intelligence officer, John Marks, and has since worked in the field of “peacebuilding.” The “Arab–Zionist conflict” is of course one of its main priorities. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Search_for_Common_Ground ↩
  25. https://lc.cx/c9NT ↩
  26. For example: at the height of our battle against the show of the pro-Zionist Boujenah, the president of a minorities association received a gift from the Palestinian Mohammed al-Madani, a member of Fatah’s Central Committee and head of its “Committee for Interaction with Israeli Society.” The “Fatah militant’s” gift was a book by “his Israeli friend (…) a member of the Writers’ Union in Israel,” with a kind dedication to “the respected Miss Yamina Thabet” (president of that association), who proudly posted it on her Facebook page. ↩
  27. The movement’s leadership in Palestine rejects all forms of normalisation with the Zionist enemy. It offers a clear but, in my view, incomplete definition of normalisation, since it mentions only Arabs’ visits to “Israel” without addressing their visits to the areas of the Palestinian Authority that “coordinates” with the occupation. It also condemns only international normalising activities, but omits the question of Zionists entering Arab countries. Although this definition needs further updating and precision, its clear principles can be extended to conclude that every form of Zionist presence in Tunisia and other Arab countries must be rejected. https://lc.cx/c9KX ↩
  28. https://lc.cx/c96M [link no longer works] ↩
  29. https://lc.cx/c9u2 ↩
  30. https://lc.cx/c9LP ↩

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